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Abstract: 
Homer plays an important role in the discussion in the Hippias Minor of voluntary 
and involuntary action and their relation to knowledge and goodness. This paper 
argues that the Hippias Minor sheds light on the Homeric criticism of the late fifth 
and early fourth centuries, and that it looks forward to, and significantly influenced, 
the tradition of Hellenistic and later Homeric criticism, for which our best witnesses 
are the Homeric scholia. This paper considers Socrates’ presentation of Achilles and 
Odysseus in the Hippias Minor and makes the case, more strongly than it has been 
made before, that this dialogue was an important influence on the later critical 
tradition.  
 
 
 
Homer plays an important role in the discussion in the Hippias Minor of voluntary 
and involuntary action and their relation to knowledge and goodness. Unlike the Ion, 
to which it bears in some ways a striking resemblance, and not merely in the 
manifestly parodic presentation of the eponymous figures of the two dialogues,1 
poetry and performance are not the principal subjects of the Hippias Minor. However, 
this dialogue arguably sheds as much or even more light on the Homeric criticism of 
the late fifth and early fourth centuries as does the Ion, and – again like the Ion – it 
looks forward to, and significantly influenced, the rich tradition of Hellenistic and 
later Homeric criticism, for which our best witnesses are the Homeric scholia.2 In this 
paper, I want both to consider how Plato3 presents Socrates’ treatment of Achilles and 
Odysseus in the Hippias Minor and also to make the case more strongly than it has 
been made before that this dialogue was an important influence on the later critical 
tradition.4 I hope also to highlight some of the important and still pressing critical 
questions that this dialogue’s treatment of Homer brings to the fore, even when they 
are not formulated explicitly here by Plato. 
                                                   
* I am grateful to audiences in Cambridge and Munich for much stimulating 
discussion and to CCJ’s anonymous readers for further helpful advice. 
1 Cf., e.g., Kahn (1996) 100-4; particularly striking are the respective claims of the 
eponymous figures to superiority, cf. Ion 530c7-d7 ~ Hipp. Min. 364a7-9. 
2 For this aspect of the Hipp. Min. cf. esp. Giuliano (1995); for the Ion Hunter (2011) 
and (2012) 89-108. 
3 Throughout this paper I assume without discussion that the Hippias Minor is indeed 
the work of Plato; for bibliography on this question cf. Pinjuh (2014) 35-9. 
4 This paper makes no claim to contribute to the ‘philosophical’ issues of the 
dialogue; thus, for example, I translate ψευδής etc. as ‘liar’ etc., without regard to the 
important questions of capability v. disposition and so forth. Helpful guidance and 
bibliography for the philosophical issues of the dialogue can be found in Blondell 
(2002) 128-64 and Pinjuh (2014). 
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 When the dialogue opens, Hippias has just delivered an ἐπίδειξις on poetry 
(363c1-3), including περὶ Ὀμήρου (cf. 363b1, c2-3).5 Eudikos is encouraging 
Socrates to react to Hippias’ performance by either ‘joining in the praise’ (a 
possibility that shows how little Eudikos knows of Socrates) or by proving him wrong 
(ἐλέγχειν), and Socrates tells him that one thing he would like to ask Hippias derives 
from an opinion that he had heard expressed by Eudikos’ own father, Apemantos: 
 
καὶ γὰρ τοῦ σοῦ πατρὸς Ἀπημάντου ἤκουον ὅτι ἡ Ἰλιὰς κάλλιον εἴη 
ποίημα τῷ Ὁμήρῳ ἢ ἡ Ὀδύσσεια, τοσούτῳ δὲ κάλλιον, ὅσῳ ἀμείνων 
Ἀχιλλεὺς Ὀδυσσέως εἴη· ἑκάτερον γὰρ τούτων τὸ μὲν εἰς Ὀδυσσέα ἔφη 
πεποιῆσθαι, τὸ δ’ εἰς Ἀχιλλέα. περὶ ἐκείνου οὖν ἡδέως ἄν, εἰ βουλομένῳ 
ἐστὶν Ἱππίᾳ, ἀναπυθοίμην ὅπως αὐτῷ δοκεῖ περὶ τοῖν ἀνδροῖν τούτοιν, 
πότερον ἀμείνω φησὶν εἶναι …  
 
I used to hear your father Apemantos [saying]6 that Homer’s Iliad was a finer 
poem than the Odyssey, and that it was as much finer as Achilles was better 
than Odysseus; for of these two poems, so he said, one had been composed 
about Odysseus and the other about Achilles.7  If Hippias is willing, this is 
what I would like to ask him: which of these two men does he say is the better 
… 
Plato, Hippias Minor 363b1-c1 
 
How banal is Apemantos’ view intended to sound? Is it simply the late fifth-century 
communis opinio, at least as Plato reconstructs it?8 We might think that such a 
synkrisis leading to the establishment of a hierarchy of value came naturally to 
agonistic Greek gentlemen, particularly when the Homeric poems themselves and the 
                                                   
5 Although 363c1-3 suggests that Hippias’ performance had been a wide-ranging one, 
we are very likely intended to understand that this ἐπίδειξις was Hippias’ ‘Trojan 
Oration’, cf. below p. 0. Pace Pinjuh (2014) 99, καὶ γάρ at 363b1 need not imply that 
Hippias had discussed the question which Socrates is subsequently to pose to him, 
although 364c1-4 may in fact carry that implication: note the use of the imperfect 
tense in Socrates’ questions there to Hippias. Blondell (2002) 132 n.110 similarly 
suggests that καὶ γάρ implies that Hippias too shares Apemantos’ view; this is 
unnecessary (cf. Denniston (1954) 109), though the dialogue will make clear that 
Hippias would have sympathy with Apemantos’ view of Achilles and Odysseus, if not 
necessarily with his opinion about their respective poems. For the περὶ Ὀμήρου 
tradition more generally cf. Hunter (2012) 91-2. 
6 Some critics assume that Socrates here refers to a written work by the otherwise 
obscure Apemantos, cf., e.g., Luzzatto (1996) 29; this view is not, of course, ruled out 
by ἤκουον, but a reference to informal conversation seems to me more likely. A third 
alternative would be that Socrates heard a ‘lecture’ by Apemantos (cf. Pinjuh (2014) 
98 n.227). 
7 As Giuliano (1995) 32 notes, this apparently inconsequential observation seems to 
look forward to the later ζήτημα, preserved for us by the exegetical scholia on Il. 1.1, 
as to why the Iliad was not entitled the ‘Achilleid’, despite Odyssey being the title of 
Homer’s other poem. 
8 So, e.g., Giuliano (1995) 20, 31. Wilamowitz (1920) 136 describes the question of 
‘which is better’ as ‘rather childish’ and the inference which follows about the relative 
merit of the poems as ‘still more childish’. 
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literature which they influenced gave such prominence to comparisons between 
individual characters;9 nevertheless, the translation of what turns out to be a 
moralising or ethical judgement about the central characters of the poems into a 
judgement about the value of the respective poems is, however unsurprising it may 
now seem to us, deceptively significant.10 It would be a familiar move for the Platonic 
Socrates to begin his discussion from a piece of very commonplace wisdom, which he 
can then proceed to deconstruct, but – as again with the Ion – we should sense here a 
long history of ancient criticism beginning to unfold. In the Ion also, one of the things 
at issue was the καλόν in poetry, what makes a poem καλῶς πεποιημένον and who 
is to judge this; in that dialogue the criterion which was made to bear the principal 
weight was that of the accuracy of the information provided in the poem. In the 
Hippias Minor, however, moral judgements about the characters are to carry that 
weight, but both dialogues lead forward to a style of criticism in which the καλόν of 
poetry indeed subsumes judgements about such things as the accuracy of what is 
described and the moral value of the characters, but also looks to other, what we 
might loosely call, ‘aesthetic’ criteria. Moralising always remained at the very heart 
of mainstream criticism, and it could hardly be otherwise, given the very close links 
between ‘literary criticism’, education and rhetoric, and not just the critical 
mainstream was involved. Characters who were morally questionable, let alone 
morally worthless, were always to prove a bit awkward to handle. Aristotle found no 
place in tragedy for the μοχθηροί (Poetics 1452b36-3a4), and he condemned the 
Menelaos of Euripides’ Orestes as showing ‘unnecessary πονηρία of character’ 
(1454a29); as is well known, Aristophanes of Byzantium elaborated this into a view 
that all the characters of that play except Pylades were φαῦλοι – the play was 
χείριστον τοῖς ἤθεσι - although the play itself was a great success (Hypoth. 43-4 
Diggle).11  
 One detail of expression which is connected to this link between the moral 
goodness of characters and critical judgements about the works in which they appear 
is the oscillation between Socrates’ original question as to ‘which (of Achilles and 
Odysseus) is better’ (cf. 363b7-c1, 364b4) and Hippias’ answer in terms of 
characteristics ‘made by Homer’ (364c5); Socrates then adopts Hippias’ mode in 
referring to his initial question at 370d7-e1 (and cf. 364e5-6). However 
inconsequential this may seem, the difference between ‘Achilles is better than 
Odysseus’ and ‘Homer has made Achilles better than Odysseus’ is, from the 
perspective of the history of criticism, potentially very significant, particularly when it 
is placed, as it is in the Hippias Minor, within the overall context of a question as to 
which of their respective poems is ‘better’. If we translate ποιεῖν as ‘represent’, then 
we can see how easy is the slippage between ‘represent a character as better’ and 
‘represent a character better’; the predicative adjective fuses eventually into a quality 
of the representation rather than of the character, and this was clearly a significant 
development towards a ‘literary’ or ‘aesthetic’ mode of criticism. This is not Plato’s 
concern in the Hippias Minor, but the part that this dialogue played in opening up 
potentially powerful critical questions certainly deserves more attention than it 
normally receives.  
                                                   
9 Cf. Giuliano (1995) 32-4, adducing Iliad 2.761-9 and other passages. 
10 Pinjuh (2014) 99-101 studies the inter-relations of the various senses of καλός and 
ἀγαθός. 
11 See Fantuzzi (2014). 
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Another Platonic passage which Apemantos’ view should call to mind is 
Protagoras’ famous view of the ‘most important part of education’, expressed at the 
head of the discussion of Simonides’ poem for Scopas: 
 
ἡγοῦμαι, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐγὼ ἀνδρὶ παιδείας μέγιστον μέρος εἶναι 
περὶ ἐπῶν δεινὸν εἶναι· ἔστιν δὲ τοῦτο τὰ ὑπὸ τῶν ποιητῶν λεγόμενα 
οἷόν τ’ εἶναι συνιέναι ἅ τε ὀρθῶς πεποίηται καὶ ἃ μή, καὶ ἐπίστασθαι 
διελεῖν τε καὶ ἐρωτώμενον λόγον δοῦναι. 
Plato, Protagoras 338e7-9a2 
Socrates, I consider that the most important part of a man’s education is to be 
clever about verses. That means being able to understand in what the poets say 
what is correctly composed and what is not, and knowing how to distinguish 
them and give an account when asked. 
 
The Platonic Hippias will indeed claim to be περὶ ἐπῶν δεινός and to be able to 
‘make distinctions’; Socrates asks Hippias ‘How did you distinguish between 
(διέκρινες) Achilles and Odysseus?’ (364c2), and he later claims that he had thought 
that it was ‘difficult to judge (δύσκριτον) which of the two was better concerning 
lying and truth-telling and the rest of virtue’ (370e2-3). Protagoras’ discussion of 
Simonides’ ode is to draw attention to an alleged inconsistency in the poem, an 
inconsistency which, so Protagoras claims, would deprive it of the soubriquet of being 
καλῶς (or ὀρθῶς) πεποιημένον (339b7-10); the epideixis by Socrates which follows 
in that dialogue is (in part) an attempt to remove the charge of inconsistency.  In the 
Hippias Minor also, conversation will turn to an alleged inconsistency in Achilles’ 
words and deeds in Iliad 9. In this dialogue, it will be Socrates who insists on the 
inconsistency, though not (at any rate, not explicitly) in order to ‘downgrade’ Homer, 
but rather simply to refute Hippias’ view of the relative merits of Achilles and 
Odysseus; Hippias, for his part, admits the inconsistency, but seeks to explain it. The 
recurrent pattern running through the Protagoras and the Hippias Minor may be 
thought to point to a Platonic recreation of a genuine moment (or moments) in the 
history of criticism; it is, for example, easy enough to imagine a setting (and/or an 
origin) both for such ‘comparative’ criticism and for allegations of ‘inconsistency’ in 
sympotic discussion, and we shall see that Hippias’ answer to Socrates’ initial 
question may lend some weight to that suspicion. 
 Finally, we may wonder to what extent the view ascribed to Apemantos is 
reflected elsewhere in the literature of the late fifth century. It is, for example, a stand-
by of modern criticism of Sophocles’ Philoctetes that Odysseus is somehow 
‘sophistic’ and that the confrontation of Achilles and Odysseus in Iliad 9 forms a 
particularly important part of the background to Sophocles’ play. The Hippias Minor 
can serve to remind us that behind the tragedy lies not only Homer, but also 
contemporary and earlier discussion of the Homeric poems. When Odysseus (v. 119) 
holds out to Neoptolemus the possibility of winning a reputation as both σοφός and 
ἀγαθός, i.e. both an Odyssean and an Achillean reputation, it is hard not to think of 
the kind of debates which we see reflected in the Platonic dialogue. When, moreover,  
Neoptolemus tells Odysseus that he would ‘rather act nobly and fail than win an 
ignoble victory’ (vv. 94-5), the Sophoclean scholia (on v. 94) gloss this distinction as 
one between ‘telling the truth’ and ‘lying’ (ψευδολογία), and observe that 
‘Sophocles brings [Neoptolemus] on speaking his father’s speech, “Hateful to me like 
the gates of Hades …”’. As is very well recognized, the opening scene between 
Odysseus and Neoptolemus replays in various ways the exchange of speeches 
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between Odysseus and Achilles in Iliad 9; the scholiast certainly did not need the 
Hippias Minor to remind him of Achilles’ famous opening words, but we may well 
suspect that those words came as readily to the minds of some of Sophocles’ audience 
as they did to that of the scholiast, and the Hippias Minor may thus shed suggestive 
light on aspects of the reception of Homer at the end of the fifth century. Sophocles’ 
play was not an ‘unmediated’ creative response to Homer and the cyclic poems, but 
rather one which reflected contemporary discussion of early epic, and itself was a 
contribution to an on-going and vibrant debate. Drama is in fact some of our best 
evidence for such critical debates, however difficult this evidence is to use at the level 
of detail.  
 When Socrates gets his chance to question Hippias, he asks him ‘which (of 
Achilles and Odysseus) do you say is better (ἀμείνων) and in what respect (κατὰ 
τί)?’ (364b4-5) and (a potentially different question) ‘How did you distinguish them?’ 
(364c2). Hippias’ answer has perhaps become stale with familiarity, but its oddness is 
important: 
 
φημὶ γὰρ Ὅμηρον πεποιηκέναι ἄριστον μὲν ἄνδρα Ἀχιλλέα τῶν εἰς 
Τροίαν ἀφικομένων, σοφώτατον δὲ Νέστορα, πολυτροπώτατον δὲ 
Ὀδυσσέα. 
 
I say that Homer made Achilles the best man of those who went to Troy, 
Nestor the wisest and Odysseus the most polytropos. 
Plato, Hippias Minor 364c4-7 
 
In ascribing ἄριστος to Achilles, Hippias might be thought to be picking up Socrates’  
question as to which of the two was ἀμείνων, but the manner of the answer, in which 
three, not two, heroes are ascribed superlative qualities, suggests that Hippias rather is 
referring to Achilles’ unchallenged supremacy in battle - he is ‘best of the Achaeans’ 
– whereas it is others who take the prize in other qualities. The form of Hippias’ 
answer may be seen as a version of the familiar sympotic ‘What is best?’ question or 
of the kind of popular ‘priamel’ of which we find ‘literary’ instances in, for example, 
Sappho fr. 16 Voigt and at the head of Pindar’s First Olympian. An elegiac couplet 
which turns up in various forms in archaic and classical literature (cf. Soph. fr. 356 R) 
offers one of the clearest instances of the pattern: 
 
κάλλιστον τὸ δικαιότατον· λῶιστον δ’ ὑγιαίνειν·  
       πρᾶγμα δὲ τερπνότατον, τοῦ τις ἐρᾷ, τὸ τυχεῖν. 
Theognis 255-6 
 What is most just is fairest; best is to be healthy; the sweetest thing is to get 
what you desire. 
 
Despite the familiarity of its form, however, there is something remarkable in 
Hippias’ answer which is rarely acknowledged. It would be easy enough to imagine a 
fifth-century discussion as to which of Homer’s heroes was ‘best’ or ‘wisest’, as the 
quality being judged (prowess in battle, wisdom) was shared among more than one 
hero, although Achilles was always likely to be ἄριστος, provided that word was 
interpreted as Homer was normally understood to have used it, for Homer himself 
appeared to have cast his vote for that hero (cf. esp. Il. 2.768-9). The crown for 
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σοφία, particularly as exhibited in rhetoric,12 might, however, well have been 
disputed between Nestor and Odysseus, and there is some late evidence that a way 
was discovered to accommodate the claims of both; here again it is not difficult to see 
the Hippias Minor as a stimulus to the critical tradition. In his commentary on the 
proem of the Odyssey, Eustathius notes that in the Iliad Odysseus was not yet ‘wiser’ 
(σοφώτερος) than Nestor, but his great wanderings after the war brought him huge 
ἐμπειρία, ‘experience’, which allowed him to surpass even Nestor (Hom. 1381.61-
1382.2, cf. also 240.17-18); this interpretation is connected with a view that νόον 
ἔγνω in Od. 1.3 does not (or not only) mean ‘[Odysseus] learned the minds [of many 
men]’ but rather ‘[Odysseus] gathered intelligence’, i.e. became himself more 
intelligent as a result of his wanderings.13 The opening of the Odyssey clearly 
produced ancient responses along the lines of ‘travel broadens the mind’; a scholion 
on v. 3 explains that Homer added νόον ἔγνω because ‘there are foolish people who 
visit many cities and lands and never learn anything’ (Schol. 1.3g Pontani). How far 
back such criticism goes we cannot of course say, but the idea that Odysseus’ wisdom  
developed through his adventures certainly set in early in the critical tradition, and of 
course many modern critics have argued that such a development is already 
discernible in the Odyssey itself, as Odysseus seeks not to repeat the nearly terminal 
‘mistakes’ of the Cyclops-episode. 
If, however, one might reasonably debate about ‘who was the wisest of the 
Greeks?’, the same could hardly be said of ‘who was the most πολύτροπος?’. This 
epithet occurs only twice in the Homeric corpus (Od. 1.1, 10.330), on both occasions 
with reference to the Odysseus of the Odyssey; that it is applied to Odysseus in the 
opening verse of that poem makes it, of course, almost his signature epithet. The 
question ‘Which of the heroes was most polytropos?᾽, would, on the face of it, be to 
anyone but the Platonic Socrates a non-question.14 One can just about imagine a 
sophistic epideixis demonstrating that a hero other than Odysseus was the most 
πολύτροπος, because although this epithet is only applied by Homer to Odysseus, it 
actually refers to a quality shared by more than one hero; if indeed we can imagine 
this, however, it is primarily because that is what Socrates in fact offers us in the 
Hippias Minor.15 It is presumably important that no one in the Hippias Minor makes 
the (to us obvious) point that Homer applies the epithet only to Odysseus, and that 
fact was hardly unavailable or unknown in the fifth and fourth centuries BC; 
certainly, one does not need the TLG to discover it. When Socrates claims that he had 
absolutely no idea what Hippias meant by saying that Homer made Odysseus ‘most 
                                                   
12 For Nestor and Odysseus as Homer’s principal rhetoricians cf. esp. Pl. Phdr. 261b-
c; a contrast between these two ‘orators’ was to have a very long critical history, cf. 
the following note. 
13 Cf. the scholia on 1.3 f-h Pontani. The Hippias Minor also played a role in the rich 
tradition of rhetorical discussion about the competing speeches of Odysseus and 
Nestor in Book 2 of the Iliad; Agamemnon seems to award the palm for speaking to 
Nestor (2.370-4), and the critical tradition worked overtime to justify and/or nuance 
that decision. 
14 Cf., e.g., Blondell (2002) 135. 
15 That Socrates’ Homeric ‘performance’ in the Hippias Minor amounts to an 
epideixis περὶ Ὁμήρου is another feature shared with the Ion where, despite Ion’s 
best efforts, it is Socrates who delivers such a lecture about poetry. 
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polytropos’, his words presumably gesture to a debate about the term,16 but they leave 
us no wiser as to why Plato made Hippias answer in this way.  
One common (and attractive) answer to this problem is that Plato here 
preserves a genuine fragment of Hippias’ Homeric criticism; Diels-Kranz offer it a 
place as illustrative of Hippias’ ‘Lehre’ (86 A10), and the manner of Hippias’ 
response to Socrates, ‘I am willing to go through for you even more clearly than I did 
then what I say both about these men and others’ (364c3-4), suggests that we are to 
imagine that Hippias’ epideixis was a frequently heard performance (note the present 
tense of λέγω at 364c4). So too, it is regularly argued that the discussion which 
follows, which highlights Hippias’ negative view of πολυτροπία, shadows the real 
Hippias’ discussion of Odysseus, to a greater or lesser degree.17 Not incompatible 
with the view that we have here a ‘fragment’ of Hippias would be the observation that 
Hippias thus not only denies to Odysseus the acclaim of being σοφώτατος, but also 
avoids the obviousness of a simple synkrisis between bravery and wisdom, with the 
central figure of each poem assigned to one category; such a simple distinction would 
have foreshadowed the interpretation of the quarrel between Odysseus and Achilles, 
reported in Demodocus’ song at Od. 8.75-7, as a dispute over the relative merits of 
ἀνδρεία and σύνεσις or φρόνησις (cf. scholia on vv. 75, 77), an interpretation which 
may well in fact go back to the fifth century at least (we think again of Sophocles’ 
Philoctetes). So obvious a gambit is, however, not worthy of a Hippias in his 
epideictic pomp, a figure who, moreover, clearly sets himself up as ‘the Nestor for 
this generation’.18 The smart paradox (as Hippias sees it) in his answer, a paradox 
which Socrates’ exclamatory βαβαί in part acknowledges (364c7), is that he finds a 
hero other than Odysseus who is σοφώτατος and is thus able to assign another (very 
surprising) superlative to the Ithacan hero.  
 In seeking to unravel this question further, we enter the very murky waters of 
the relationship between the Hippias Minor, the known views of the ‘real’ Hippias, 
and the discussion of πολύτροπος by Antisthenes, which is partially preserved for us 
by Porphyry in his note on the opening verse of the Odyssey. The problems 
surrounding this fascinating text cannot be dealt with here at any length,19 but they 
                                                   
16 Cf. further below. 
17 A variant of this view is that the answer of the Platonic Hippias goes back to a 
representation of Hippias by Antisthenes, cf. further below. 
18 Lampert (2002) 238, cf. Blondell (2002) 134 on Nestor as ‘ancestor and paradigm’ 
for sophists such as Hippias. Hippias wrote a ‘Trojan Oration’ in which Nestor 
advised Neoptolemus on how a young man could achieve renown (Hippias Maior 
286a5-b4, Hippias, 86 A2, 9 D-K); this was, very likely, the very epideixis to which 
Socrates had just listened as the Hippias Minor opens (cf. Hipp. Mai. 286b5-6). 
Socrates’ ironic praise of Hippias at Hipp. Mai. 281c2-3 is perhaps intended to echo 
Hippias’ own claims in the ‘Trojan Oration’. Brancacci (2004) suggests that Hippias’ 
plea to Socrates and Protagoras at Protagoras 337e2-8b2 is modelled on that of 
Nestor to Achilles and Agamemnon at Iliad 1.274-9; the idea is attractive, particularly 
in view of Hippias’ obvious interest in the figure of Nestor. 
19 Cf. Pfeiffer (1968) 37, and esp. Giuliano (1995) and Luzzatto (1996), both of whom 
supply rich bibliography; further bibliography may be traced also through Montiglio 
(2011) 21-4. The text bristles with problems, both textual and interpretative, but many 
do not affect the limited scope of the present discussion. Richardson (1975) 77-81 
offers a general survey of Antisthenes as a Homeric critic, but his view of the 
discussion of πολύτροπος has been superseded. One aspect of the matter which has 
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can also not simply be ignored. The relevant part of the scholium reads as follows in 
Pontani’s text:20 
 
οὐκ ἐπαινεῖν φησιν Ἀντισθένης Ὅμηρον τὸν Ὀδυσσέα μᾶλλον ἢ ψέγειν,  
λέγοντα αὐτὸν πολύτροπον. οὔκουν τὸν Ἀχιλλέα καὶ τὸν Αἴαντα 
πολυτρόπους πεποιηκέναι, ἀλλ’ ἁπλοῦς καὶ γεννάδας· οὐδὲ τὸν 
Νέστορα τὸν σοφόν οὐ μὰ Δία δόλιον καὶ παλίμβολον τὸ ἦθος, ἀλλ’ 
ἁπλῶς τῷ Ἀγαμέμνονι συνόντα καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅπασι καὶ εἰς τὸ 
στρατόπεδον εἴ τι ἀγαθὸν εἶχε συμβουλεύοντα καὶ οὐκ 
ἀποκρυπτόμενον. καὶ τοσοῦτον ἀπεῖχε τοῦ τὸν τοιοῦτον τρόπον 
ἀποδέχεσθαι ὁ Ἀχιλλεύς, ὡς ἐχθρὸν ἡγεῖσθαι ὁμοίως τῷ θανάτῳ 
ἐκεῖνον, 
ὅς χ’ ἕτερον μὲν κεύθῃ ἐνὶ φρεσίν, ἄλλο δὲ εἴπῃ (Il. 9.313). 
λύων οὖν ὁ Ἀντισθένης φησί· τί οὖν; ἆρα γε πονηρὸς ὁ Ὀδυσσεύς ὅτι 
πολύτροπος ἐρρέθη; καὶ μήν, διότι σοφός,  οὕτως αὐτὸν προσείρηκεν 
μήποτε οὖν τρόπος τὸ μέν τι σημαίνει τὸ ἦθος, τὸ δέ τι σημαίνει τὴν τοῦ 
λόγου χρῆσιν· εὔτροπος γὰρ ἀνὴρ ὁ τὸ ἦθος ἔχων εἰς τὸ εὖ 
τετραμμένον. τρόποι δὲ λόγου +αἴτιοι αἱ+ πλάσεις· καὶ χρῆται τῷ τρόπῳ 
καὶ ἐπὶ φωνῆς καὶ ἐπὶ μελῶν ἐξαλλαγῆς, ὡς ἐπὶ τῆς ἀηδόνος· 
ἥ τε θαμὰ τρωπῶσα χέει πολυηχέα φωνήν (Od. 19.521) 
εἰ δὲ οἱ σοφοὶ δεινοί εἰσι διαλέγεσθαι, ἐπίστανται καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ νόημα 
κατὰ πολλοὺς τρόπους λέγειν· ἐπιστάμενοι δὲ πολλοὺς τρόπους λόγων 
περὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ, πολύτροποι ἂν εἶεν. εἰ δὲ οἱ σοφοὶ, καὶ ἀγαθοί εἰσι. διὰ 
τοῦτό φησι τὸν Ὀδυσσέα Ὅμηρος σοφὸν ὄντα πολύτροπον εἶναι, ὅτι δὴ 
τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἠπίστατο πολλοῖς τρόποις συνεῖναι. 
Schol. Hom. Od. 1l Pontani = Antisthenes fr. 51 Caizzi 
 
Antisthenes says that Homer does not praise Odysseus so much as blame him, 
in calling him polutropos.21 He did not make Achilles and Ajax polutropoi, but 
straightforward and noble; nor, by Zeus, was the wise Nestor devious and 
unstable in his character, but he dealt straightforwardly with Agamemnon and 
everyone else, and if he had any good advice for the army he gave it and did 
not conceal it. So far was Achilles from accepting such a character that he 
considered as hateful as death any man ‘who concealed one thing in his heart 
and said another’ (Il. 9.313). Antisthenes’ solution was as follows. What then? 
Was Odysseus a bad man because he was called polutropos? Rather, he called 
him this because he was wise. Is it not the case that tropos may mean 
‘character’, but also means ‘the use of words’? A man who is eutropos has a 
character which is turned towards the good, but the tropoi of words are … 
                                                                                                                                                 
not yet received the attention it deserves is that Dio Chrys. 71.2-3 juxtaposes a 
reworking of Hipp. Min. 368b-d to a description of Odysseus which seems all but 
certainly indebted to Antisthenes’ discussion of πολύτροπος, cf. Fornaro in 
Nesselrath (2009) 144. That passage of Dio is, admittedly, an intertextual patchwork: 
ἀπαρχὰς τῆς σοφίας in 71.2 seems to go back to Plato, Prt. 343b1, which is more 
fully reworked in 72.12. 
20 I accept the now standard view that the last part of the scholium, beginning with a 
reference to Pythagoras, has nothing to do with Antisthenes. For other English 
translations of the scholium cf. Kahn (1996) 122-3, Montiglio (2011) 21-2. 
21 On the difficulties that this sentence has caused cf. Luzzatto (1996) 306-8. 
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And [Homer] uses tropos both for the voice and for the exchange of songs, as 
of the nightingale, ‘who frequently rings the changes as she pours out her 
richly varied voice’ (Od. 19.521). If the wise are clever at dialogue, they know 
also how to express the same thought in many tropoi; as they know many 
tropoi of words about the same thing, they would be polutropoi. If they are 
wise, they are also good. For this reason Homer says that Odysseus, who is 
wise, is polutropos, because he knows how to converse with men in many 
tropoi. 
 
The obvious contradiction between the two claims in the scholium about what 
Antisthenes said is most easily explained by the fact that the negative view of 
πολύτροπος with which the text opens was indeed expressed in a work of 
Antisthenes, but it is not a view to which Antisthenes himself subscribed. This has 
often led to the view that this work was very likely a dialogue, and the suggestion (or 
assumption) has, moreover, often been made that this will have been a dialogue 
between Hippias, who expressed the negative view with which the text begins, and 
Socrates. I am very sceptical of at least the second half of this view, and Luzzatto 
rightly, I think, remains non-committal about the nature of Antisthenes’ text; 
Porphyry offers the familiar shape of a Homeric ‘problem’ and its ‘solution’, but we 
cannot assume that this is how Antisthenes presented it – his work, perhaps the περὶ 
Ὀδυσσείας, might have been an essay, not a dialogue. Be that as it may, the Hippias 
Minor certainly lends colour to the suggestion that the negative view of πολύτροπος 
expressed in Antisthenes’ work was there associated with Hippias; the features shared 
between the two texts, including the quotation of the opening of Achilles’ speech to 
Odysseus in Iliad 9, are certainly very striking. Scholars have sought arguments as to 
whether Plato is responding to Antisthenes, or vice versa, or whether both are 
responding independently to Hippias, or indeed whether the truth lies in some 
combination of these possibilities; the problem has both a specific interest for the 
history of Socratic discussion, and also a broader methodological importance for the 
study of fourth-century philosophical texts in general, but neither can properly be 
pursued here. 
 Antisthenes’ account of πολύτροπος turns on a semantic analysis of the kind 
in which we know he was very interested. τρόπος has, in this analysis, two meanings, 
and in πολύτροπος Homer is alleged to use the noun in its linguistic sense of ‘form 
of speech, speech-usage’; the evidence for this claim is apparently found in the use of 
τρωπάω of the nightingale and its voice in one verse of the Odyssey. There is no 
other evidence to support this alleged usage of Homer, and so we might at least 
wonder in passing what was the tone of Antisthenes’ defence of Odysseus. Modern 
readers are very quick to see Socrates’ treatment of Achilles in the Hippias Minor as 
unserious or even as a parody of Homeric criticism,22 but we might think that 
Antisthenes’ argument, as far as the scholium of Porphyry allows us to reconstruct it, 
has at least as good a claim to have been ‘playful’, in whatever sense we wish to 
interpret that. That Antisthenes seems to have represented Odysseus as a master of 
                                                   
22 Cf. below p.0. I suspect that we may be able to see the influence of Antisthenes’ 
discussion in the famous riddling epigram of Philitas about the alder-tree (fr. 10 
Powell = 25 Spanoudakis = 12 Sbardella). Cerri (2005) has persuasively connected 
this poem with Odysseus and, if this is correct, the final verse μύθων παντοίων 
οἶμον ἐπιστάμενος may evoke πολύτροπος, as explained by Antisthenes, just as (so 
Cerri) πολλὰ μογήσας in v. 3 evokes πολύτλας and similar epithets. 
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Socratic-style dialectic must increase our sense that this epideixis, like so many 
sophistic performances, was leavened with a generous dose of the humorously 
paradoxical. We may perhaps compare the claim of the Platonic Protagoras that 
Orpheus, Homer, Hesiod and so forth were all sophists avant la lettre (Prt. 316d-e). 
As for what might have been Antisthenes’ discussion of the other meaning of τρόπος, 
namely ἦθος, ‘character’, we can reconstruct little of this, but – as critics have noted 
– Eustathius’ observation (Hom. 1381.41) that Homer never uses τρόπος in this 
sense, and so πολύτροπος could not mean ‘having an unstable/changeable character’, 
may eventually go back to a fuller version of Antisthenes’ text; certainly, Porphyry’s 
citation is in turn an important source for Eustathius’ discussion. 
 One further aspect of Porphyry’s summary of Antisthenes is important in the 
present context. Although the negative view of πολύτροπος, whether that was 
expressed in the character of Hippias or by Antisthenes himself before he demolished 
it, contrasts Odysseus with Achilles and Ajax and cites Achilles’ speech from Iliad 9, 
it is hard to believe that Antisthenes’ defence of Odysseus and of the positive 
meaning of πολύτροπος was not rooted in the Odyssey, rather than in the Iliad. As 
Socrates’ initial citation of Apemantos’ view in the Hippias Minor shows, a contrast 
between Achilles and Odysseus must (almost inevitably) be a contrast between the 
central figure of the Iliad and the central figure of the Odyssey; it is, after all, the 
Odysseus of the Odyssey whom Homer called πολύτροπος. Hippias’ mistake (or one 
of them) was to ground his argument in Book 9 of the Iliad, despite how Socrates 
introduced the subject; Hippias does observe that ‘Homer made Odysseus [a liar] in 
many places both in the Iliad and in the Odyssey’ (365c1-2), but in making no 
distinction between the character in the two poems, he not only shows himself (again) 
a not particularly sophisticated reader, but also plays into Socrates’ hands. As we have 
already seen, later criticism at least was clear that Odysseus’ character ‘developed’ 
between the two poems,23 and it would not surprise to learn that such views were 
already familiar in the late fifth and fourth centuries. One might indeed think that 
Hippias’ confusion in the Hippias Minor either must be read against the existence of 
such a critical view or itself was one of the stimuli to this later view.  
When Socrates asks Hippias for clarification of his view, the question is again 
phrased not as we might have expected: ‘Was not Achilles represented as polytropos 
by Homer?’ (364e5-6). Hippias’ answer had in fact not excluded the possibility that 
Achilles had been so represented, as Hippias had been dealing in superlatives; our 
inference from what follows may be that Socrates phrased his question in this way 
because he did not (yet) understand how Hippias was using the term, for it is only 
after Hippias’ fuller response that he claims to begin to see that, for Hippias, 
πολύτροπος is a synonym of ψευδής (365b7-8, cited below). The technique of slow 
revelation suggests, as indeed we would have known from elsewhere, that the actual 
meaning of πολύτροπος was anything but undisputed. Hippias’ response is that the 
Homeric Achilles was ‘not at all’ πολύτροπος, but rather ‘very straightforward and 
most truthful’ (ἁπλούστατος καὶ ἀληθέστατος), and in support of this he cites, as 
apparently also did Antisthenes, the opening of Achilles’ great speech to Odysseus in 
Iliad 9: 
 
  διογενὲς Λαερτιάδη, πολυμήχαν’ Ὀδυσσεῦ, 
      χρὴ μὲν δὴ τὸν μῦθον ἀπηλεγέως ἀποειπεῖν,   
      ὥσπερ δὴ κρανέω τε καὶ ὡς τελέεσθαι ὀίω·  310 
                                                   
23 Cf. above p.0. 
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      ἐχθρὸς γάρ μοι κεῖνος ὁμῶς Ἀΐδαο πύλῃσιν,  312 
  ὅς χ’ ἕτερον μὲν κεύθηι ἐνὶ φρεσίν, ἄλλο δὲ εἴπηι. 
      αὐτὰρ ἐγὼν ἐρέω, ὡς καὶ τετελεσμένον ἔσται. 
 
ἐν τούτοις δηλοῖ τοῖς ἔπεσιν τὸν τρόπον ἑκατέρου τοῦ ἀνδρός, ὡς ὁ μὲν 
Ἀχιλλεὺς εἴη ἀληθής τε καὶ ἁπλοῦς, ὁ δὲ Ὀδυσσεὺς πολύτροπός τε καὶ 
ψευδής· ποιεῖ γὰρ τὸν Ἀχιλλέα εἰς τὸν Ὀδυσσέα λέγοντα ταῦτα τὰ ἔπη.  
Plato, Hippias Minor 365a1-b624 
 
“Son of Laertes, god-born, Odysseus of the many plans, I must speak out 
straightforwardly as I judge it and think will come about. As hateful to me as 
the gates of Hades is that man who conceals one thing in his heart and speaks 
another. But I will tell you how it will be.” In these verses he reveals the 
character of each man: Achilles is truthful and straightforward, Odysseus 
polutropos and a liar, for he represents Achilles speaking these verses to 
Odysseus. 
 
Here the later critical tradition was to follow where Hippias, at least the Platonic one, 
had led,25 and it is worth pausing a moment to note the conclusions which were later 
drawn from these verses. The exegetical scholia on vv. 307-9 claim that they 
represent Achilles as φιλότιμος, ἁπλοῦς, φιλαλήθης, βαρύθυμος, εἴρων, and the 
scholia on v. 309 note that his speech is, as we might say, a rhetoric-free zone: 
περιπλοκὰς οὐκ οἶδε λόγων. His speech is marked by ‘unelaborated free-speaking’ 
(ἀκόσμητος παρρησία). The contrast, of course, as in Hippias’ account, is with 
Odysseus. περιπλοκὰς οὐκ οἶδε λόγων (of Achilles) all but explicitly denies that 
one of the most familiar ancient interpretations of πολύτροπος was applicable to 
Achilles, whereas the whole thrust of the exegetical scholia to Odysseus’ speech had 
been towards working out its strategies, why he speaks as he does and what implicit, 
‘concealed’ meanings lie behind his words (cf., e.g., scholia on 226, 252, 259-60); 
with Achilles, however, it is changes of style which are foregrounded, for there is no 
doubt (for the scholia) about what he is actually saying. As for Hippias’ 
understanding of πολύτροπος as synonymous with ψευδής, it is a reasonable 
conclusion that something very like this was mooted (only to be rejected) by 
Antisthenes, but there is in fact no other evidence to suggest that such an 
interpretation was generally familiar before, or indeed widespread thereafter, although 
πολύτροπος, ‘cunning’, might at any time carry a negative resonance.26 It is 
Antisthenes and Plato who established that interpretation within the tradition.  
 The description of Achilles in the scholia on vv. 307-9 as εἴρων is of some 
interest also in this connection. The Homeric scholia and other critics regularly see 
                                                   
24 The omission of v. 311 is most naturally explained by the fact that it would not 
contribute to Hippias’ argument. 
25 Cf. Giuliano (1995) 50-2. Modern scholars have been much exercised by whether, 
despite the generalizing form of vv. 312-13, Achilles in fact has Agamemnon or 
Odysseus in mind in these verses, cf. Heiden (2002) 432-3, citing earlier 
bibliography; the Platonic Hippias has no doubt that the reference is to Odysseus, and 
again the later scholiastic tradition was to follow suit, cf. the T-scholia on vv. 312-13 
with Erbse’s note. 
26 Cf. the passages collected by Montiglio (2011) 162-3. 
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the trope of εἰρωνεία in Homeric speeches,27 and in those of Achilles no less than any 
others, including his speech to Odysseus in Book 9 (cf. scholia on vv. 348, 359, 399). 
Outside Aristotle, εἰρωνεία is not necessarily incompatible with a commitment to 
truth-telling,28 but in the binary system of oppositions between Achilles and Odysseus 
which the scholia have inherited and which they elaborate, it is hard not to see the 
suggestion that, if Achilles is εἴρων, then Odysseus must be ἀλαζών; even in the 
Aristotelian system, although the mean between ἀλαζονεία and εἰρωνεία is the 
condition (ἕξις) of being truthful, it is in fact the alazon, who ‘takes delight in 
ψεῦδος’ (EN 4.1127b9-11), who is truly the opposite of the truthful man, ‘for [the 
alazon] is worse [than the eiron]’ (EN 4.1127b31-2). The scholia attribute ἀλαζονεία 
to a number of Homeric characters and speeches, including in fact to one verse (v. 
401) of Achilles’ speech to Odysseus in Iliad 9, but it is for the scholia a particular 
characteristic of Hector and the Trojans, often labelled as ἀλαζονεία βαρβαρική.29 
Although we ought not place too much weight upon the fact, it is certainly noteworthy 
in this connection that the principal term used in the Hippias Minor to denote 
‘deceivers’, such as (in the common view) Odysseus, against whom Achilles’ speech 
is directed, is indeed ἀλαζών, cf. 369e4, 371d2, and it is precisely in this quality 
which Socrates, with shocking paradox, claims Achilles surpassed Odysseus (371a2-
7). It would of course not be sensible to claim that the Hippias Minor lies at the root 
of a distinction between Achilles and Odysseus as εἴρων and ἀλαζών: too much of 
what Odysseus says in the Odyssey, notably in Books 9-12, was (or could be taken as) 
such obvious ἀλαζονεία, that the idea must have been a commonplace.30 Rather, we 
might think of such a commonplace coming together with an opposition between 
Odysseus and Achilles, an opposition centred upon their confrontation in Iliad 9, and 
itself engendering, perhaps under the influence of Aristotle, the idea that Achilles was 
εἴρων. The process was doubtless messy and unsystematic, but it is hard to doubt (I 
think) that the Hippias Minor played some part in this critical development also, 
particularly as Odysseus’ speech to Achilles is not, as Socrates is going to make very 
clear, ἀλαζονικός, certainly by Odysseus’ standards elsewhere. As is well known, 
binary oppositions tend to multiply, even where they do not all equally fit the case. 
 The embassy to Achilles in Iliad 9 was a very famous text for later 
rhetoricians and declaimers,31 and Achilles’ opening words are very often cited or 
evoked. A history of that reception would in fact deserve its own essay, and the 
                                                   
27 Cf. Van der Valk’s edition of Eustathius, II p. lx n.6, Nünlist (2009) 212-13 on 
‘rhetorical irony’; Nünlist however perhaps underplays the range of effects which the 
scholia identify by this term. 
28 Eustathius’ note on this speech of Achilles tracks that of the exegetical scholia very 
closely, but he omits εἴρων from the list of adjectives which describe Achilles (Hom. 
751.24); this may be because of the negative associations that the term could carry, 
and Eustathius would not wish his pupils to find such negative characteristics in 
Achilles.  
29 Cf., e.g., the scholia on Iliad 8.182, 515, 10.417, 12.441, 16.833.  
30 In discussing Menelaos’ account of his travels in Odyssey 4, Strabo observes that 
‘everyone who recounts his own wanderings is an ἀλαζών’ (1.2.23), and it is indeed 
hard in that context not to remember Odysseus; in recalling Strabo’s bon mot, 
Eustathius indeed applies it to both Menelaos and Odysseus (Hom. 1381.59). 
31 It is the first passage mentioned by Quintilian (IO 10.1.47) in his list of Iliadic 
passages which are of particular interest to the would-be orator. 
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Hippias Minor would play a major part in any such history,32 but let me point to only 
one further aspect of Hippias’ quotation which looks forward to the later critical 
tradition. ‘In these verses’, says Hippias, ‘he reveals each man’s character (τρόπος) 
…’ (365b5-6); Hippias twice in this passage makes clear that the verses are spoken by 
Achilles, but the subject of δηλοῖ, ‘he reveals’, must be Homer. Nothing of course is 
more familiar in ancient quotation-practice than the ascription of the views of a 
character in a narrative or drama to the poet himself, and the present case is normally 
dismissed in this way.33 This may, however, be to let Hippias off too lightly. An 
Aristotle certainly would have known that although these verses tell us much about 
Achilles, we should judge Odysseus from his own words, not from those of others; 
when Aristotle says (Poetics 1450b7-10) that ‘character (ἦθος) reveals (δηλοῖ) the 
nature of moral choice (προαίρεσις)’, he might almost have been thinking of this 
same opening to Achilles’ speech in Iliad 9. Socrates’ refusal to take Achilles’ self-
presentation at face value, without also examining his actions (which also, of course, 
are revelatory of προαίρεσις (Poetics 1454a17-18)), might then be thought to be a 
simple critical step forward, but it is one whose repercussions are still with us. We 
might also recall that, in later Homeric criticism at least, many apparent ‘problems’ in 
the Homeric text were solved by appealing to the fact that they arise from what a 
character, not the poet himself, says; this is the so-called λύσις ἐκ τοῦ προσώπου. 
Something like this can be identified as early as Aristotle (frr. 146, 163 Rose = 370, 
387 Gigon),34 but familiarity with the general principle might again be much earlier, 
and in the present context it is of some interest that Lucia Prauscello has identified 
such a case, and one associated with Antisthenes, in Plato’s Laws.35 Here again, then, 
is another simple critical principle of which the Platonic Hippias is ignorant. 
 When Socrates picks up the Homeric thread at 369a8, he has apparently 
established that the true and the false man must be the same, not different, but Hippias 
is not convinced and wants to restart the debate about Achilles and Odysseus; as 
several critics have recognized, the argument with Socrates as to whose opinion will 
prevail is set up by Hippias as a kind of internal reflection of the debate as to which of 
Achilles and Odysseus is ‘better’: 
 
 εἰ δὲ βούλει, σὺ αὖ ἀντιπαράβαλλε λόγον παρὰ λόγον, ὡς ὁ 
ἕτερος ἀμείνων ἐστί· καὶ μᾶλλον εἴσονται οὗτοι ὁπότερος 
ἄμεινον λέγει. 
Plato, Hippias Minor 369c6-8 
 
If you like, oppose argument to argument, showing that the other one is better. 
These people will then know more clearly which man speaks better.  
 
Ancient criticism was indeed a very competitive, agonistic business. In Hippias’ 
mind, so we are to understand, it is also clear that he himself is the Achilles; at the 
                                                   
32 The Hippias Minor has, for example, a role in the later connection between 
Achilles’ words and rhetorical teaching about ‘figured speeches’, cf., e.g., 
Philostratus, VS 542. 
33 Cf., e.g., Pinjuh (2014) 111, 113. Eustathius also ascribes the thought of Iliad 
9.312-13 to ‘the poet’ and in the context of the poet’s rejection of a negative form of 
πολυτροπία (Hom. 1381.39). 
34 For bibliography and discussion cf. Nünlist (2009) 116-19. 
35 Prauscello forthcoming. 
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beginning of the dialogue he had presented himself as ‘never having met anyone 
better (κρείττων) than himself’ in the business of ἀγωνίζεσθαι at Olympia (364a6-
8),36 and now he portrays Socrates as an Odysseus: 
 
ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀεὶ σύ τινας τοιούτους πλέκεις λόγους, καὶ ἀπολαμβάνων 
ὃ ἂν ἧι δυσχερέστατον τοῦ λόγου, τούτου ἔχηι κατὰ σμικρὸν 
ἐφαπτόμενος, καὶ οὐχ ὅλωι ἀγωνίζηι τῶι πράγματι περὶ ὅτου ἂν ὁ λόγος 
ἧι· 
Plato, Hippias Minor 369b7-c237 
 
Socrates, you are always weaving arguments like this, and you pick out the 
most difficult part of the argument and you stick to it, examining it in detail, 
and you never deal with the whole subject of the discussion. 
 
Socrates turns this pattern also on its head when he subsequently accuses Hippias of 
himself playing the role (μιμεῖσθαι) of Odysseus (370e10-11). That Hippias shows 
both Achillean and Odyssean traits might be seen as an ironic dramatisation of 
Socrates’ argument that the true and the false person are one and the same.38  
Socrates proceeds to identify inconsistency, and hence ‘falsehood’, in 
Achilles’ speech.39 The hero said, as he had already said to Agamemnon (1.169-71), 
that he would return home ‘tomorrow’, but there is no sign that he ever made the 
slightest move towards doing so (Il. 9. 357-63). Odysseus, on the other hand, tells no 
lies in the verses which Hippias had quoted, by which Socrates presumably means all 
of Odysseus’ speech to Achilles in Book 9.40 Modern criticism has made much of 
Odysseus’ ‘economical’ report to Achilles of what Agamemnon had said,41 although 
(interestingly) it is not clear that anyone in antiquity ever did; the scholia on v. 392 do 
link Achilles’ use of the term βασιλεύτερος to Agamemnon’s use at v. 160, but that 
is not the same as accusing Odysseus of deliberate misrepresentation. Hippias makes 
no attempt to deny the facts as Socrates stated them, but rather seeks to explain them 
                                                   
36 Hippias’ ‘contest’ with Socrates is therefore Olympic as well as Homeric; cf., e.g., 
Lampert (2002) 234. 
37 Rather similar is Hippias’ complaint about Socrates’ methods of argumentation at 
Hippias Maior 301b2-5. The idea of Socrates as an Odysseus has often been brought 
into connection with the end of our dialogue (376c), where the Homeric discussion all 
but otherwise disappears. There Socrates uses the image of ‘wandering’ for the state 
of aporia into which the apparently inevitable, but obviously (at the very least) 
counter-intuitive, conclusions of the logos have led him, cf., e.g., Blondell (2002) 
159. Whereas Odysseus was able to end his wanderings when he ‘reached’ 
(Od.11.122) people who did not know the sea, Socrates and other ἰδιῶται will never 
cease from wandering, even after ‘reaching’ the σοφοί, for the σοφοί themselves are 
no less wanderers. For another view of Socratic πολυτροπία in the Hippias Minor cf. 
Montiglio (2011) 42. 
38 Later, an association between Odysseus and Hippias became familiar (cf., e.g., Dio 
71. 2-3) and may of course have been promoted by Hippias himself. 
39 There are, of course, much deeper philosophical issues about ‘speaking (un)truth’ to 
which this section of the dialogue points, but I here leave them out of account. 
40 Socrates’ οὐδαμοῦ at 369e5 perhaps resonates with Hippias’ πολλαχοῦ at 365c2.  
41 Cf., e.g., Lynn-George (1988) 118-22, Elmer (2015) 168, citing earlier 
bibliography. 
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away; here, as we have seen, the discussion takes the familiar (later) form of a 
Homeric ‘problem’ and its ‘solution’.42 Hippias’ defence of Achilles appeals to a 
distinction between voluntary and involuntary falsehood, something which any 
follower of the Platonic Socrates will recognize as very likely to lead to dialectical 
disaster: 
 
οὐ γὰρ καλῶς σκοπεῖς, ὦ Σώκρατες. ἃ μὲν γὰρ ὁ Ἀχιλλεὺς ψεύδεται, 
οὐκ ἐξ ἐπιβουλῆς φαίνεται ψευδόμενος ἀλλ’ ἄκων, διὰ τὴν συμφορὰν 
τὴν τοῦ στρατοπέδου ἀναγκασθεὶς καταμεῖναι καὶ βοηθῆσαι· ἃ δὲ ὁ 
Ὀδυσσεύς, ἑκών τε καὶ ἐξ ἐπιβουλῆς. 
Plato, Hippias Minor 370e5-9 
 
You do not look at this in the right way, Socrates. When Achilles lies, he 
obviously does this not by design, but unwillingly, as he is compelled by the 
terrible situation of the army to remain and offer assistance; when Odysseus 
lies, he does it willingly and by design. 
 
When Socrates returns to the attack by noting that Achilles says something different 
yet again to Ajax, namely that he will not fight until the Trojan advance reaches his 
very own camp (9. 650-5), Hippias can explain that as well: 
 
ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτὰ ταῦτα ὑπὸ εὐνοίας ἀναπεισθεὶς πρὸς τὸν Αἴαντα ἄλλα 
εἶπεν ἢ πρὸς τὸν Ὀδυσσέα· ὁ δὲ Ὀδυσσεὺς ἅ τε ἀληθῆ λέγει, 
ἐπιβουλεύσας ἀεὶ λέγει, καὶ ὅσα ψεύδεται, ὡσαύτως. 
εὐνοίας F: εὐηθείας TWf 
Plato, Hippias Minor 371d8-e3 
Here too Achilles was led by goodwill towards Ajax to say different things 
than he said to Odysseus; Odysseus, on the other hand, always speaks by 
design, both when he tells the truth and when he lies. 
 
Hippias’ explanations have received a favourable reception in modern criticism, from 
Wilamowitz on.43 In her study of the debate about the term πολύτροπος, Maria 
Luzzatto described Hippias’ account as ‘from Homer’s point of view undoubtedly 
correct’,44 and in her important discussion of the Hippias Minor Ruby Blondell 
describes Hippias’ views as ‘perfectly plausible’, whereas Socrates’ treatment of the 
Homeric scene is ‘farcical’, ‘absurd’ and ‘ludicrous’;45 Charles Kahn too describes 
Socrates’ account as ‘a deliberately misleading account of Achilles’ character, 
supported by a deep knowledge of the Homeric text … [a] distorted picture of 
Achilles’,46 and suggests that the whole dialogue may be seen ‘as a kind of reductio of 
                                                   
42 The truth or otherwise of Odysseus’ report back to the Greek commanders at the 
end of Book 9 was certainly later discussed as a ζήτημα, cf. below p.0. 
43 Cf. Wilamowitz (1920) 138. 
44 Cf. Luzzatto (1996) 296. 
45 Cf. Blondell (2002) 145-6; Blondell does, however, see a serious philosophic 
purpose here and also has useful remarks on the Socratic criticism of literary 
discussion based on selective quotation. Lampert (2002) 245 describes Socrates’ 
Homeric exegesis as ‘indefensible’. 
46 Kahn (1996) 124. Schmiel (1983/4), on the other hand, is prepared to take Socrates’ 
charges seriously. 
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the moralizing or “allegorical” interpretation of Homer’. There may, again, be 
something to be said on the other side. 
Before turning to Hippias’ account itself, however, we may consider (again) 
the versions offered by the extant scholia, which themselves of course may (and 
probably do) show the influence of the Hippias Minor.47 The exegetical scholia on v. 
309c note the variations in Achilles’ statements: he tells Odysseus that he will go 
away, Phoenix that he will stay, but not fight, which is in fact a not very accurate 
account of Il. 9. 618-19, and Ajax that he will fight when ‘necessity’ makes him do 
so. In the context of explaining Achilles’ adverb ἀπηλεγέως in v. 309, the scholia 
also note that ‘those who wish to cause pain remove any optimistic hopes’, and it may 
be thought that this applies particularly to the answer to Odysseus. The scholia on vv. 
651-2 tell a similar, though rather more nuanced, story:48 
 
He says to Odysseus that he will sail away (for he was still terribly inflamed 
by anger), to Phoenix, when he is already growing calmer (πραϋνόμενος), 
that he will give thought to staying, and to Ajax he says, from a sense of 
αἰδώς, that he will come to their aid when the enemy are near at hand; he does 
not want to make his return to the fighting appear to the Greeks either 
impossible or imminent, to make clear the magnitude of what he has suffered. 
bT-scholia on Homer, Iliad 9.651-2 
 
Whether or not this account of Achilles’ behaviour is plausible, it does have the merit 
of at least taking account of the important interchange with Phoenix, which Hippias 
and Socrates both ignore in the Hippias Minor. Whether Plato expects us to notice the 
omission from Socrates’ account of Achilles’ words of Phoenix’s speech and of 
Achilles’ non-committal response to him (vv. 618-19) may be thought uncertain; if 
the omission is deliberate, then it is tempting to see such an omission as a trap for 
Hippias, who proves not sharp enough to pick up the point, although some later critics 
obviously did.49 
Hippias explains the fact that Achilles did remain at Troy from the fact that 
‘he was compelled by the disaster which befell the army to remain and come to their 
aid’ (370e7-8). As we have seen, the scholia on 309c also appeal to ‘necessity’, but 
very differently so: on this view, Achilles tells Ajax that he will fight when he has to. 
The theme of ‘constraint’ upon Achilles appears elsewhere in the scholia, but I think 
we are at least entitled to ask how ‘plausible’ Hippias’ account at 370e7-8 (cited 
above) actually is. We might take βοηθῆσαι to refer to Achilles allowing Patroclus to 
go out to fight in his own armour, but I doubt that many will be convinced that this is 
what Hippias means; at its best, his is a very loose paraphrase of what happens in the 
poem, and one of which no sophist, let alone a modern critic, should be proud. It is, of 
course, fair to point out that many ancient plot summaries may seem to us quite far 
removed from ‘what actually happens’, but Hippias’ account in 370e is anything but a 
‘close reading’. As for Achilles’ reply to Ajax, Hippias (371e1) ascribes this to 
                                                   
47 My account here is inevitably close to the important discussion in Giuliano (1995) 
50-2. 
48 Cf., e.g., Pinjuh (2014) 186. [Plut.] De Hom. 2.169 also tells a similar story, though 
with rather different emphases. 
49 Cf. Lampert (2002) 245. Giuliano (1995) 51 n.104 also notices the omission of 
Phoenix from the Hippias Minor, but asks rather different questions about it. 
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εὐήθεια or εὔνοια, depending on the reading adopted,50 whereas the scholia put it 
down to αἰδώς, as the A-scholia on vv. 618-19 also explain Achilles’ concession to 
Phoenix. This latter motive is easy enough to understand: Ajax’s words, like 
Phoenix’s much longer speech before him, have stung Achilles’ sense of how he is 
perceived by his colleagues – he acknowledges that Ajax’s words are κατὰ θυμόν to 
him (v. 645) - and how it is expected that he should react to the supplicatory embassy 
which has now come to him; this precisely falls in the realm of αἰδώς (note also 
αἴδεσσαι in v. 640).51 It is this too which inhibits the hero from simply leaving his 
colleagues to their fate and/or from refusing to meet Hector’s challenge when his own 
fate and that of his beloved Myrmidons is at stake; he will, however, exact a very high 
price for the damage which has been done to his honour. It obviously makes a 
difference, as the scholia recognize, that he is speaking to Phoenix and to Ajax, not to 
Agamemnon, but we may well doubt whether either εὐήθεια or εὔνοια is a 
particularly good explanation for saying to Ajax that he will rejoin the fighting once 
Hector reaches the Myrmidon camp, ‘after killing Argives and setting fire to the 
ships’, a verse missing from Porphyry’s quotation of the passage; at the very least, 
Ajax must have had mixed feelings about Achilles’ professed intentions. Once again, 
it may be objected that I am in danger of demanding from Hippias the kind of ‘close 
reading’ and interpretation which we ourselves take for granted, and the absence of 
which is (notoriously) one of the things which often seems most puzzling about 
ancient discussions of literature. Whatever view one takes, however, it is I think clear 
that Hippias’ brief explanation hardly does any kind of justice to the Homeric text. 
As for the choice between εὐήθεια and εὔνοια, Giuliano has argued strongly 
in favour of the first alternative, which is that of the principal branch of the tradition, 
in the sense of ‘(possession of) good ἦθος’ (cf. Rep. 3.400d11-e4), as ἦθος is always 
a central part of ancient discussions of Achilles; we might note that [Plutarch] 
precisely observes that Achilles’ answer to each of the three ambassadors reveals his 
ἦθος γενναῖον ἅμα καὶ ἁπλοῦν (De Hom. 2.169),52 and it might be argued that 
εὐηθείας offers a better contrast to ἐπιβουλεύσας (371e3) than would εὐνοίας. 
Giuliano further notes that the alternative reading might have arisen because, as time 
passed, the pejorative sense of εὐήθεια had come to dominate.53 On the other hand, 
we might be reminded of the link which Thucydides draws between τὸ γενναῖον, 
which Achilles certainly possesses, and τὸ εὔηθες (3.83.1), and it is at least curious 
that when Achilles observes to Odysseus that he will not allow Agamemnon to 
deceive him a second time (Il. 9.375-6), the AbT-scholia observe that it is a mark of 
εὐήθεια to be deceived once by a φίλος, but of μωρία to let it happen twice. 
Moreover, εὔνοια (towards Ajax) would be an explanation which minimized 
                                                   
50 Cf. below p.0. 
51 Cf. also the bT-scholia on v. 642, and Cairns 1993: 92-5, Gill 1996: 193-7 (neither 
of whom, however, refer to the scholia). 
52 This passage of [Plutarch] also reminds us of the irony of Socrates’ πάνυ γενναίως 
at Hipp. Min. 370d5. 
53 Giuliano (1995) 55, cf. also Luzzatto (1996) 320, Pinjuh (2014) 197-8, Culverhouse 
(2015), and εὐηθείας is also read by Vancamp (1996) 121. Giuliano (1995) 51 also 
seeks to make Hippias’ explanation of εὐήθεια amount to much the same thing as the 
scholiastic explanation of αἰδώς; that seems to me mistaken. That εὐνοίας is 
preserved only in F is, of itself, no argument against this reading; on the nature and 
value of F cf. Dodds (1959) 41-7, Vancamp (1996) 31-3. The account of this passage 
in Gaudin (1981) 149 seems to me without value. 
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Achilles’ ‘deceitfulness’, thus bringing him closer to an action which could be 
described as ἄκων, and would also acknowledge Ajax as a brave (and ἁπλοῦς)54 hero 
in the Achillean mould; in other words, it explains specifically why it is Ajax to 
whom these words were spoken, and thus gestures towards the very long tradition of 
myth, art and literature linking these two heroes, not least with regard to the award of 
Achilles’ arms after his death. The reading εὐνοίας thus seems to give Hippias a 
rather stronger rhetorical point against Socrates, if not necessarily a better reading of 
Homer. 
 If it is indeed the case that Hippias’ defence of the ‘inconsistency’ in his and 
Achilles’ position is not a very strong one, we might reflect that it could have been 
worse, when we remember how Ion ‘defends’ his position in the dialogue named after 
him. Socrates, of course, is not particularly interested in the interpretation of Iliad 9 
for its own sake: the fact that Odysseus appears to tell the truth here but be a notorious 
liar elsewhere becomes one manifestation of the apparent paradox that the truth-teller 
and the liar are one and the same, together with the further problems to which that 
conclusion leads. For the Platonic Socrates, the Homeric text is a useful jumping-off 
point, not an end in itself. Plato, however, also pushes us towards a more far-reaching 
view, and one which still presses us urgently today, about the characters of literature. 
What kinds of questions are we to ask of what they say? How are we to move from 
what is said in epic or drama to the ethical situations which we ourselves face? By 
‘defamiliarising’ Achilles for us, by showing us a πολύτροπος Achilles, Socrates, 
who is certainly in this dialogue a ‘closer reader’ than is Hippias, makes us confront 
the comfortable (and comforting) assumptions into which criticism of classic (and 
classical) texts too easily sinks. Socrates may not be particularly interested in 
proceeding much further down that path, but we can hardly shun the trail towards 
which he beckons us. Moreover, if we were to substitute ἀνώμαλος for πολύτροπος, 
the Hippias Minor would take us very close to a prominent ancient view of Achilles’ 
character. Apparently in connection with Achilles’ behaviour towards Priam in Iliad 
24, Aristotle declared that Achilles’ character was ‘changeable, unstable’, 
ἀνώμαλον,55 and certainly his changes of mood in that climactic episode might well 
deserve such a label, however psychologically true modern readers might find this 
extraordinary portrait of emotional fragility.  
Ancient scholars, like their modern descendants, were also much interested in 
the question of why, when the ambassadors report back at the end of Iliad 9, 
Odysseus only reports the straightforward refusal which Achilles gave to him, without 
mentioning the rather more hopeful responses to Phoenix and Ajax.56 The exegetical 
scholia on vv. 682-3 ascribe various motives, honourable as well as disreputable, to 
Odysseus, but in his extended discussion of the matter Eustathius adds (inter alia) that 
one reason for Ajax’s own silence might have been his knowledge of the fact that 
Achilles had made different promises to each of the three ambassadors; as a result of 
                                                   
54 Cf., e.g., scholia on Il. 9.622, 17.720. 
55 Fr. 168 R = 391 Gigon, cf. Eustathius, Hom. 783.18 (with Van der Valk’s note), 
1359.17-22, 1365.55-8, 1366.1, Richardson (1980) 273. On this aspect of Achilles cf., 
e.g., Else (1957) 462-3. 
56 Cf. Hainsworth’s note on Il. 9.682-3 and Griffin on 9.676ff. The helpful account of 
the matter in Scodel (1989) is in fact very close to the ancient discussions and to that 
of Eustathius; of particular interest is her stress on how often Achilles changes his 
mind, from Book 1 on, a characteristic which, so she argues, the ambassadors in Book 
9 might see as a mark of Achilles’ ‘inherent unreliability’. 
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this, Ajax does not think that one should pay any attention to Achilles, given that 
hero’s ‘inconsistency’ (παλιμβολία).57 Whether or not such an observation had 
ancient forerunners we cannot say,58 but it is very hard here not to be reminded of the 
Hippias Minor, where Achilles’ πολυτροπία precisely consists in the different 
responses he gave to Odysseus and Ajax. So too, Porphyry reports that one of the 
Homeric ‘problems’ discussed at the Museum in Alexandria was why Odysseus’ 
report back to the Greeks omitted what Achilles had said to Ajax, thereby not 
reporting ‘the truth’.59 The solution offered was that Odysseus did indeed give a true 
report of what Achilles had said to him, but by saying that Achilles only ‘threatened’ 
(v. 682) to sail away on the following morning, Odysseus in fact takes account of the 
different answers which Phoenix and Ajax had received and which he had heard. Here 
again, then, is a debate in which Odysseus’ truthfulness is championed and Achilles’ 
changefulness, whether that be ἀνώμαλον or πολύτροπον, hangs heavy in the 
background. 
The Hippias Minor, then, may well lie, at an unknown number of removes, 
behind more than one important strand of the ancient discussion of Iliad 9. More 
importantly perhaps, we will again be reminded that Socrates’ account of Achilles and 
Odysseus in that book pointed the way towards a reading which was certainly not 
dismissed out of hand, as it too often is today, by various communities of readers at 
particular times in the past. With our own philosophical and moral concerns, we may 
want to insist, like Hippias, that Achilles may be ‘inconsistent’, but that does not 
make him a ‘liar’ or indeed even πολύτροπος; that, however, is a different matter 
from seeking fairly to assess the claims of the Hippias Minor and the critical tradition 
which seems to have been influenced by it.  
 I have been largely concerned in this essay with critical traditions which are 
most visible to us from the Homeric scholia, but it may be that we can in fact trace the 
influence of the Hippias Minor at a much earlier date and in a very significant place. 
The meeting of Odysseus and Achilles in Iliad 9, and in particular Hippias’ account of 
the opening of Achilles’ speech, might well be seen with hindsight not merely as a 
confrontation of two very different characters (in both senses), but also as a marker of 
the difference between the two poems of which they are the principal focus; the same, 
of course, might be true for their subsequent meeting in the Underworld in Odyssey 
11, but that is not something to be pursued here. Certainly, it would not be difficult to 
show that the Iliad is in many senses ἁπλοῦς, whereas the Odyssey is both complex 
and πολύτροπος.60 One reason, of course, that it would not be difficult is that 
                                                   
57 Hom. 783.17-19, cf. 1359.19 on Achilles’ παλίμβολον ἦθος; on the choice here 
and elsewhere between παλιμβουλία and παλιμβολία cf. Van der Valk ad loc. 
58 Diomedes’ conclusion that the only thing which will influence Achilles is that 
hero’s θυμός (Il. 9.702-3) might also have played some role in the subsequent critical 
tradition. 
59 Cf. MacPhail (2011) 156-9, and the D-scholia on v. 679. 
60 This holds good, I think, despite the ancient view (cf. the scholia on Odyssey 1.1c 
and d Pontani) that Homer devised the Telemachy in order to add ποικιλία to his 
poem, or as the scholium on 1.1c puts it, ἵνα μὴ μονότροπος ἧι τῆς ποιήσεως ὁ 
τρόπος, an observation which almost invites us to remember πολύτροπος. There is 
of course an important distinction between the πεπλεγμένον and the ποικίλον. 
Eustathius expands on how Homer fills out the brief and simple story which forms the 
story of the Odyssey (Hom. 1379.41-4), cf. Pontani (2000) 28; Eustathius ascribes to 
the Odyssey a ‘depth of thought amidst surface simplicity (ἁπλότης)’.  
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Aristotle has already shown the way. For Aristotle, the Iliad is ἁπλοῦν καὶ 
παθητικόν, whereas the Odyssey is πεπλεγμένον καὶ ἠθική (Poetics 1459b14-16).61 
When Aristotle describes the well-constructed tragic plot (ὁ καλῶς ἔχων μῦθος) as 
‘single’ and as involving a ‘change from good fortune to bad fortune, not because of 
any wickedness, but because of a great hamartia on the part of a character such as I 
have stated [i.e. someone of high reputation and prosperity] or a character who is 
better rather than worse’ (1453a12-16), it is hard not to think of the Iliad, if only 
because Aristotle proceeds to award second prize to a plot which is explicitly like the 
Odyssey (1453a32), and if Homer comes second, then only Homer can also come 
first.  
The essence of the πεπλεγμένον lies in περιπέτεια καὶ ἀναγνώρισις 
(Poetics 1455b33), and the Odyssey in fact is ‘recognition all the way through’ 
(1459b15); recognition itself is defined as ‘a change from ignorance to knowledge, 
[leading to] either friendship or hostility’ (1452a29-30). There is much that could be 
said (and has been) about both the power and the limits of Aristotle’s distinctions, but 
Aristotle’s categorization of the Odyssey clearly gives the greatest weight to 
‘recognitions’ of personal identity, which are central to Odysseus’ poem. There is, 
moreover, another way in which the Odyssey cannot be ἁπλοῦς for Aristotle, namely 
that its structure (σύστασις) is double, διπλῆ, because ‘the better and worse 
characters end up in opposite ways’ (Poetics 1453a31-3); we are probably entitled to 
draw the inference that I just have, namely that the Iliad is, in this respect also, 
ἁπλοῦς (cf. also 1453a12), though we are here entering some of the thorniest 
problems of the Poetics. Nevertheless, a link between the discussion of the characters 
of Achilles and Odysseus in the Hippias Minor and Aristotle’s classification of 
narrative and plot structures seems not implausible. 
 Aristotle’s view of the two Homeric poems, at least in the relevant parts of the 
Poetics, seems to follow, almost as an afterthought, from his developed views about 
tragedy. Nevertheless, epic may well have played a role in the development of those 
views, both of the ‘simple’ and the ‘complex’ and of pathos and ethos, given the stark 
nature of some of the differences between the Iliad and the Odyssey. Pathos and ethos 
would require extended discussion, but for what it is worth Aristotle at one point 
defines πάθος as πρᾶξις φθαρτικὴ ἢ ὀδυνηρά (1452b11), and he exemplifies such 
an action by ‘deaths in full view, great agonies and woundings and such things’; he is 
writing of tragedy, but it is hard not to think of the opening of the Iliad, with the 
griefs and deaths caused by the μῆνις of Achilles; as for the Odyssey, there too we 
have ‘many griefs suffered on the sea’, but before that we are promised a poem about 
an ἀνὴρ πολύτροπος, a poem (in other words) of ἦθος. This is, however, a man 
whom we do not really get to see until Book 5, whereas in the Iliad the μῆνις and its 
consequences burst upon us almost immediately. The poem of outburst and 
confrontation is set against the poem of brooding and biding one’s time, of plotting 
and deception. The point is familiar enough to need no further labouring.62 Aristotle 
needed nothing other than the poems themselves to see how their plot structures 
differed and to formulate a distinction between them in terms of ‘the simple’ and ‘the 
complex’ (or ‘entwined’), but we know that he knew the Hippias Minor (we would 
have assumed this anyway)63 and it does not seem utterly implausible that the 
                                                   
61 On the dichotomy of πάθος and ἦθος cf. esp. Gill (1984). 
62 For how this distinction may play out in the area of language use cf., e.g., Elmer 
(2015). 
63 Cf. Arist. Metaph. 4.1025a6. 
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distinctions made in that dialogue about Achilles and Odysseus have had some 
influence on the arguments, or the formulation of the arguments, about plot structures 
in the Poetics. In other words, although epic follows in the Poetics on the coat-tails of 
tragedy, epic, mediated in part through the Hippias Minor, might have nudged 
Aristotle down the path he followed. 
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